RIRIN RIZKI INAYAH

Vendor managed forecasting: A case study of small enterprise, Enterprises use supply chain management practices for improving business or supply chain performance. It is observed that supply chain technologies like VMI are now becoming an integral part of enterprise’s strategy. Even small and medium enterprises can adopt this practice and improve the performance of supply chain. This paper discusses vendor managed forecasting with the help of case study. It shows how a small enterprise improves supply chain performance by using demand related information obtained from retailer. The results obtained in the study shows that vendor managed forecasting in supply chain reduces the demand variation and improves inventory management significantly.

In recent years, many enterprises have been compelled to share demand and inventory information with their suppliers and customers to get the competitive advantage (Disney & Towill, 2003). Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is one of such information sharing mechanisms adopted by organizations. In VMI, the vendor or supplier is given the responsibility of managing the customer’s stock, based on the shared information between them (Jung et al., 2004). Vendor coordinates and integrates all supply chain activities into a seamless process. As a result of VMI adoption drastic improvements are observed in supply chain and business performance.

Several performance measures have been reported in the literature to measure different aspects of the supply chain performance. Usually the measures are inventory levels, service levels, order fulfillment time, total supply chain cost, forecasting accuracy, supply chain flexibility, fill rates etc. A careful study of these measures shows that the common denominator is accurate demand forecasting. If the forecast is not accurate, the quantity ordered by retailers may not reflect the demand for the period and the errors in retailers forecast may pass to the supplier in form of distorted orders (Zhao et al., 2003). Therefore forecasting results are very influential in making managerial decisions and evaluating performance of the company (Haq & Kannan, 2006).

It has been observed that, to improve the accuracy of forecasts there is an incessant need to interact with supply chain partners and share right kind of information at right time. Enterprises adopt latest information technology tools to share real-time information. However, many Enterprises experiences difficulty in adoption of IT tools. Moreover, it is found that adoption is more difficult for small and medium enterprises. In a dedicated supply chain, where small and medium enterprises are under vendor managed inventory pact with retailers; the retailers and managers at SMEs do not have a capacity and capability of forecasting the demand accurately. Rudberg et al. (2002) have suggested that collaboration and demand information sharing with supply chain partners to establish a joint forecast; could reduce demand uncertainty within the supply chain. Taking the motivation we decided to adopt Vendor managed Inventory, specifically Vendor Managed Forecasting practice in a small scale Industry. It is known that for adopting VMI, organizations use supply chain software. Supply chain software’s have an inbuilt algorithms based on statistical forecasting models which assist organizations in forecasting. The case company was not able to afford the software. Therefore, it was decided to go for traditional VMI and develop manual forecasts based on statistical models. The accuracy of the forecast highly depended on the information provided by retailers about the demand. So, information sharing mechanism was also developed.

In this paper we have studied vendor managed forecasting for a small-scale enterprise located at the central part of India. The objective of study is to show how that information sharing mechanism helps a small-scale enterprise to make a better forecast and improve the supply chain performance. In the process we have compared the forecasts obtained from different statistical models .The remaining organization of the paper is as follows. In the section 2, we have presented the literature that focuses on quantitative forecasting models. Section 3, describes the case study and action research methodology. Section 4 ponders performance measurement. Section 5 discusses the results and finally in Section 6 conclusions are drawn.

Perspektif kontingensi pada Model “inovasi terbuka” saat ini disebut-sebut sebagai jalur unggul untuk mencapai kesuksesan jangka panjang. Daripada mengandalkan sumber daya mereka sendiri yang terbatas untuk penelitian dan pengembangan dalam sistem penemuan tertutup tradisional, perusahaan didorong untuk berbagi pengetahuan melintasi batas-batas perusahaan untuk meningkatkan potensi inovatif mereka. Namun, pembagian tersebut juga dapat memiliki konsekuensi yang merugikan dengan mengurangi kelangkaan penemuan perusahaan. Makalah ini sesuai mencoba untuk mengidentifikasi dan menganalisis parameter yang menentukan apakah jenis manajemen inovasi terbuka atau tertutup paling sesuai untuk perusahaan tertentu. Mengikuti perspektif kontingensi, kami memeriksa faktor-faktor penentu ini sebagai berbagai kendala internal dan eksternal (faktor situasional). Lebih khusus lagi, menerapkan konsep yang berkaitan dengan daya serap, sumber daya pelengkap,

Peningkatan jumlah akademisi (misalnya, Chesbrough, 2003, 2004, 2006; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2005; Sakakibara, 2003) dan praktisi (misalnya, Huston & Sakkab, 2006; Rivette & Kline, 2000 ) yang menggembar-gemborkan model “inovasi terbuka” sebagai yang unggul, jika bukan satu-satunya cara (lihat, misalnya, Huston & Sakkab, 2006) bagi perusahaan untuk mencapai kesuksesan jangka panjang dalam lingkungan pasar yang bergerak cepat saat ini. Ide utamanya adalah bahwa alih-alih mengandalkan sumber daya terbatas yang dapat dikumpulkan oleh satu perusahaan untuk penelitian dan pengembangan dalam sistem penemuan tertutup tradisional, pendekatan terbuka untuk berbagi pengetahuan melintasi batas-batas perusahaan dapat sangat memperluas dan mempercepat potensi inovatif perusahaan.

Sementara mengakui potensi besar yang terletak pada penerapan yang benar dari prinsip ini, makalah ini mencoba untuk lebih mendefinisikan kondisi batas yang menentukan apakah jenis manajemen inovasi terbuka atau tertutup benar-benar akan menghasilkan nilai tertinggi bagi perusahaan tertentu. Secara khusus, berbagi pengetahuan dengan orang lain kemungkinan akan mengurangi potensi kelangkaan penemuan akhir yang dihasilkan perusahaan sebagai hasil dari proses ini. Karena ini jelas akan meningkatkan tekanan persaingan dan hasil yang diharapkan bias ke bawah, kita perlu menganalisis properti apa yang terkait dengan inovasi terbuka yang dapat mengimbangi efek negatif ini.

Berikut ini, kami mengidentifikasi sejumlah faktor internal dan eksternal perusahaan seperti kapasitas penyerapan, sumber daya pelengkap, atau teori permainan, yang kemungkinan akan membentuk kontinjensi utama yang menentukan apakah inovasi terbuka memang merupakan pilihan yang unggul, dan kapan tidak. Analisis kami melampaui penyelidikan baru-baru ini ke dalam isu-isu serupa (misalnya, Knudsen, 2005; Laursen & Salter, 2005; West, 2006), dengan, pertama, lebih eksplisit menganalisis dua sisi “keterbukaan” (yaitu, “membeli” dan ” penjualan” pengetahuan di pasar), dan, kedua, dengan menawarkan proposisi yang dapat diuji mengenai bagaimana dampak dari masalah ini, dan dengan demikian kebajikan inovasi terbuka, bervariasi di antara berbagai jenis perusahaan. Tambahan,

Will incentive contracts persist? for uccessive duopoly under moral hazard, The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for a processor to offer an incentive contract to an upstream producer or the spot market? We determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their input. Our results show that under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract persistence.

According to principal-agent theory, incentive contracts (i.e., contracts that tie compensation to performance) are needed to elicit “effort” from agents to perform tasks that are valuable to the principal, but onerous to the agent (Milgrom &Roberts, 1992). There are many examples of incentive contracts used in practice, such as share tenancy in agriculture (e.g., Otsuka, Chuma & Hayami, 1992; Laffont & Matoussi, 1995), managerial compensation (e.g., Lemmon, Schallheim & Zender, 2000; Murphy, 1986), and franchising (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1999).

Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that, where contracting is repeated many times and the agent has discretion in actions including the level and timing of effort, the structure of the optimal pay scheme is linear in the observed principal ́s payoff. Hence, in vertical relationships with moral hazard the linear incentive contract is preferred to successive monopoly at the spot market. The reason for this is that the linear incentive contract aligns the individual incentives with their joint-surplus maximizing interests by trading off some of the risk sharing benefits for provision of incentives.

Can we expect the same result in the case of successive oligopolies? As the introduction of strategic behavior changes some relevant features of market competition, it cannot be presumed that the conclusions for successive monopoly carry over to successive oligopolies. In this paper, we focus on studying whether the above result holds for the case of successive duopoly.

Pioneering studies by Stiglitz (1974), Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) within the principal-agent framework have emphasized the role of risk sharing and incentive alignment as possible motivations for incentive contracts. Since these early contributions, the incentive contract has received more and more attention. In fact, many analysis have modelled the incentive contract in different contexts, such as monitoring (Baiman & Demski, 1980; Agrawal, 2002), tournaments (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Holmstrom, 1982; Green & Stokey, 1983; Mookerjee 1984; Knoeber & Thurman, 1995; Rankin & Sayre, 2000, Hueth & Ligon, 2001), repeated agency contexts (Lambert, 1983; Rubinstein & Yaari, 1983; Radner, 1985; Rogerson, 1985; Spear & Srivastava, 1987; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1990; Ma, 1994; Matthews, 1995; Wickelgren, 2003), and agency models with several principal and agents (Barros & Macho-Stadler, 1998; Ray & Singh, 2001; Serfes, 2005; Dam & Pérez-Castrillo, 2006). Although all these models have provided a better understanding of the incentive contract under different settings, to the best of our knowledge there are no studies that have paid attention to the strategic implications of the principals ́ choices. That is, if contracts are chosen strategically, taking into account, among other things, market competitive forces.

While it is difficult to find studies of the incentive contract in presence of market competition, there is no disputing the growing interest in vertical integration. The earliest literature in this field treated the case of successive duopoly without uncertainty. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) concluded that for a succesive duopoly at each stage, producing a homogenous product, an integrated duopoly was the equilibrium structure. If the products are differentiated, Bonnano and Vickers (1988) showed that vertical separation is an equilibrium structure. Later contributions investigated the integration between Cournot oligopolists in both the upstream and downstream stages. When the number of oligopolists is equal in both industries, Greenhut and Ohta ́s conclusions can be extended to successive oligopoly. However, these conclusions do not remain when the number of firms in each industry is unequal. In this last case, emergence of vertical integration rarely is the unique dominant strategy (Abiru, Nahata, Raychaudhuri & Waterson, 1998). Hence, the vertical integration as an equilibrium structure is sensitive to the specific conditions of market competition.

The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine whether the incentive contract can emerge as an equilibrium outcome in vertical relationship with upstream and downstream competition under moral hazard. We consider a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation with two processors and two primary producers. We determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their input. Our results show that, with successive duopolies, it is always a dominant strategy for each processor to offer an incentive contract to one producer. Thus, in equilibrium, both processors offer an incentive contract.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 introduces the concept of equilibrium and the equilibrium results. A summary and concluding remarks are in Section 4. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.

Sejarah & Latar Belakang

Sejarah “Makam marmer putih atau Taj Mahal yang dibangun pada tahun 1631-48 di Agra, kedudukan Kekaisaran Mugal, oleh Shah Jehan untuk istrinya, Arjuman Banu Begum, monumen atau Taj Mahal ini merangkum banyak tema formal yang dimainkan melalui arsitektur Islam. Keanggunannya yang halus Sangat kontras baik dengan arsitektur Hindu di India pra-Islam, dengan dindingnya yang tebal, lengkungan berkerudung, dan ambang pintu yang tebal, dan dengan gaya Indo-Islam, di mana unsur-unsur Hindu dipadukan dengan bermacam-macam motif eklektik dari Persia dan Sumber Turki. ”

Taj Mahal dianggap sebagai salah satu dari delapan keajaiban dunia, dan beberapa sejarawan Barat mencatat bahwa keindahan arsitekturalnya tidak pernah tertandingi. Taj adalah monumen terindah yang dibangun oleh Mughal, penguasa Muslim India. Taj Mahal seluruhnya dibangun dari marmer putih. Keindahan arsitekturalnya yang memukau tak bisa dilukiskan dengan memadai, terutama saat fajar dan matahari terbenam. Taj tampaknya bersinar di bawah cahaya bulan purnama. Di pagi yang berkabut, pengunjung menikmati Taj seolah tertahan jika dilihat dari seberang sungai Jamuna.

Taj Mahal dibangun oleh seorang Muslim, Kaisar Shah Jahan (wafat tahun 1666 M) untuk mengenang istri dan ratu tercinta Mumtaz Mahal di Agra, India. Ini adalah “keanggunan dalam marmer” atau beberapa orang mengatakan ekspresi “mimpi.” Taj Mahal (artinya Istana Mahkota) adalah Makam yang menampung makam ratu Mumtaz Mahal di ruang bawah. Makam Shah Jahan ditambahkan kemudian. Nama asli ratu adalah Arjumand Banu. Dalam tradisi Mughal, wanita penting dari keluarga kerajaan diberi nama lain pada pernikahan mereka atau pada acara penting lainnya dalam hidup mereka, dan nama baru itu biasa digunakan oleh publik. Nama asli Shah Jahan adalah Shahab-ud-din, dan dia dikenal sebagai Pangeran Khurram sebelum naik tahta pada tahun 1628.

Desain & Konstruksi Taj Mahal

Desain interior Taj Mahal Taj Mahal dibangun selama dua puluh dua tahun, mempekerjakan dua puluh ribu pekerja. Selesai dibangun pada 1648 M dengan biaya 32 Juta Rupee. Dokumen konstruksi menunjukkan bahwa arsitek utamanya adalah Ustad ‘Isa, arsitek Islam terkenal pada masanya. Dokumen tersebut berisi nama orang yang dipekerjakan dan inventaris bahan bangunan serta asalnya. Pengrajin ahli dari Delhi, Qannauj, Lahore, dan Multan dipekerjakan. Selain itu, banyak pengrajin Muslim terkenal dari Baghdad, Shiraz dan Bukhara mengerjakan banyak tugas khusus.

Makam ini merupakan bagian dari kompleks luas yang terdiri dari pintu gerbang utama, taman yang rumit, masjid (ke kiri), wisma (ke kanan), dan beberapa bangunan megah lainnya. Taj Mahal berada di ujung terjauh dari kompleks ini, dengan sungai Jumna di belakangnya. Taman besar berisi empat kolam pemantul yang membaginya di tengah. Masing-masing dari empat bagian ini selanjutnya dibagi lagi menjadi empat bagian dan kemudian masing-masing menjadi empat bagian lagi. Seperti Taj, elemen taman berfungsi seperti Arabesque, berdiri sendiri dan juga merupakan keseluruhan.

Menara ini memiliki dasar segi delapan dan badan silinder yang meruncing ke paviliun terbuka bersisi delapan. Badan menara dibagi oleh tiga balkon yang menciptakan bayangan dan ketertarikan pada desain yang polos. Pita bertahtakan marmer yang indah dan pola geometris dengan desain chevron mengelilingi menara di bawah balkon atas. Puncak finial berlapis emas yang bertengger di puncak kubah Taj Mahal mencapai 67 meter di atas tanah. Di bagian atas ada kuncup teratai dan di bawahnya ada periuk air. Pengaturan ini diadaptasi ke dalam domain Islam dari abad ke-12. Fungsinya murni dekoratif, mengiringi bentuk kubah.

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